This survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and private R&D investment over the past five decades. The survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues. We aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity. In particular, we emphasise a set of issues that, in our view, are critical to understanding the potential effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D spending. Special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm R&D, the constraints faced by the firm (such as financial constraints), and the amount and source of public subsidies. None of these issues have been investigated in depth. We formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field.
INTRODUCTION
The use of public funding to foster private research and development (R&D) activities is a common practice in many countries. According to Eurostat (2009) , the public share in R&D activities from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was about 35% in the EU27, 30% in the United States, and 18.5% in Japan. Furthermore, a sizeable amount of these public funds is actually used to subsidise R&D activities undertaken by private firms.
The major argument raised by economists to justify the public support of R&D (through public subsidies, among other means) is that market failures would otherwise hamper firms from reaching the socially optimal level of R&D (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1988) . Such market failures have to do with the incomplete appropriability of R&D returns and the problems of information and incomplete markets. The 'public good' characteristics of R&D would prevent firms from completely appropriating the potential benefits from the innovations generated from their R&D activities as other firms would have the opportunity to free ride. Even if innovations could be fully appropriated, the existence of capital market imperfections may also lead private firms to disregard socially valuable R&D projects (Griliches, 1986; Hall, 2002) . Due to the risk associated with R&D activities and information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, the financial opportunities to engage in R&D activities are limited.
Policymakers could then contribute to reducing the cost of riskier but socially valuable R&D projects, increasing the firms' expected return to such R&D projects.
Certainly, public policies should be aimed at supporting only those private R&D projects that are socially desirable and would not otherwise be undertaken. Nevertheless, given the aforementioned information problems associated with R&D projects, identifying the target projects to which public effort should be devoted is not a simple task. Typically, public policies to support private R&D have consisted of tax allowances and, above all, public subsidies to partially fund private R&D projects. 1 The conditions for both eligibility and granting decisions are very broad and differ over time and among countries or regions and sectors of activity. To ascertain the effectiveness of public expenditures in this context, a large body of empirical research has assessed the relationship between public R&D subsidies and company-financed R&D. The major research question has been whether public R&D subsidies are either complementary and, thus, 'additional' to company-financed R&D or whether they substitute for and, thus, 'crowd out' private R&D . After almost five decades of research, the empirical evidence is mixed, and the question is far from having a conclusive answer. The disparity in results can be attributed to differences in the populations under study (time periods, countries of interest, business sectors), the variables used, and the empirical approach (see, among others, Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Capron and Van Pottelsberghe, 1997; David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004; González and Pazó, 2008) .
The main goals of this survey are to provide a critical and systematic review of the empirical literature on the relation between public R&D subsidies and private R&D investment and to identify issues that may require further exploration. 2 Namely, we are concerned with firm R&D dynamics and composition, firm financial structure, and the history and funding sources of subsidies (i.e., federal/national, regional or local). We seek to connect these issues with situations under which the alternative hypotheses of additionality (i.e., the crowding-in effect) and substitution (i.e., the crowding-out effect) are more likely to occur.
This knowledge could help researchers to obtain new insights and, hence, gain a better understanding of the real nature of the link between public R&D subsidies and private R&D spending.
To the best of our knowledge, and as will be observed in the literature review, the evidence about the roles of the aforementioned issues in the impact of public subsidies on company-financed R&D is limited. Despite its importance, research has mostly focused on solving several methodological problems, like the choice of the most valid evaluation method, and on extending previous studies to other contexts (e.g., a different time period, country, or sector of activity).
The study is organised as follows. The second section provides a systematic review of the empirical literature about the link between public R&D subsidies and company-financed R&D. We use this baseline to deepen our examination of each of the critical issues at stake and posit our research assumptions in the next section. The paper ends with our concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Blank and Stigler (1957) were among the first researchers to perform an empirical analysis of the relationship between publicly funded and private R&D investment. Their results were mixed, with evidence supporting both additionality and substitution effects. Such findings are highly representative of the evidence reported since then in this field of study. In Table 1 we provide a representative list of the most relevant empirical studies carried out since the middle of the 1960s, which amount to 77 quantitative empirical studies. The table indicates the authorship, the country in which the study was performed, the sample period, the unit of analysis, the definition and measurement of the relevant variables, the empirical approach, and the main findings. We also report for each paper whether the following essential standardised issues were accounted for: a) the sources of public subsidies; b) the composition of firm R&D; c) the firm's past and current subsidies; d) the specific time lag structure, namely short-and/or long-term effects; e) the functional form of the effect (linear or nonlinear); and f) the potential financial constraints. Additionally, in the last column of the table, we report for each study an indicator of its age-weighted citations to provide a measure of its relative impact in the subsequent development of this research topic.
Insert Table 1 about here
We can summarise the results from Table 1 From a theoretical point of view, the net effect of public subsidies on the level of company-financed R&D is ambiguous. There exist counteracting effects, and the net effect depends on different factors. Needless to say, testing the additionality hypothesis is a policyrelevant issue for evaluating the use of public funds to subsidise private R&D activities. The existence of conflicting results among different empirical studies is usually ascribed to methodological differences related to the unit of analysis (country, industry, firm, establishment or plant), the geographical scope, the measurement and definition of the variables or the quantitative methods used. As mentioned earlier, such methodological differences hamper comparisons of results between different empirical studies. Table 1 shows that about three fourths (56 out of 77) of the reviewed studies were conducted at the microeconomic level, for which the unit of analysis is the firm or even the plant and/or line of business, whereas the remaining studies used aggregate data by industry or by country. In line with Mansfield and Switzer (1984) , and others (e.g., Ali-Yrkkö, 2005; David et al., 2000; Levy and Terleckyj, 1983) , we advocate for the obvious advantages of firm-level studies. Studies at a high level of aggregation cannot account for heterogeneities between firms. Precisely, this literature is aimed at evaluating the effect of public subsidies, which are granted at the firm level, so the relevant unit of analysis is the firm itself. Table 2 summarises, for the whole list of studies, the distribution of the overall findings by a simple vote-counting approach. The sample of studies in Table 1 has been grouped according to the disaggregation level and the geographical scope of the analysis.
Approximately 60 percent of the studies find that public subsidies are complementary and thus 'add' to private R&D investment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this result is prevalent regardless of the level of aggregation considered.
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Insert Table 2 about here
In light of Table 1 , the following issues with respect to data structure are worth mentioning. First, studies differ widely in the time period under analysis. Second, studies using cross-sectional data prevail over those using longitudinal data. Third, the dominant geographical scope for testing the effectiveness of R&D subsidies has changed substantially over time. Until the 1990s, most of the empirical studies were performed with US data, and occasionally data from Canada or the UK. Since the 1990s, most studies have used data from the EU and other developed countries (Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden). However, the conflicting results obtained in different studies are independent of the group of countries considered (see Table 2 ). Studies of developing countries, in addition to Özçelik and Taymaz (2008) for Turkey, are very scant. Fourth, studies also differ in the industries considered.
Most studies are focused on manufacturing industries. However, there are many differences in the degree of innovation across different manufacturing industries. Whereas many studies consider firms belonging to industries with different innovation levels, others are concentrated on firms operating in high-technology industries (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Ali-Yrkkö, 2005; Duguet, 2004; Howe and McFetridge, 1976; Klette and Møen, 1998; Koga, 2005; Leyden and Link, 1991; Leyden et al., 1989; Mansfield and Switzer, 1984; Shrieves, 1978; and Wallsten, 2000) .
Other potential sources of ambiguity in the results include the alternative definitions and measures of the main variables of interest. With regard to the dependent variable, private R&D, there are several alternative measures, as shown by Table 1 . The most common measure is R&D intensity, i.e., firm R&D expenditure relative to sales. Two alternative measures of R&D expenditure are used: total R&D expenditures and private R&D expenditures (i.e., total R&D expenditures minus the amount of total public R&D subsidies).
With regard to the subsidy variable, studies differ in considering public grants, contracts, or total government funding of firm R&D activity. Quite often, measurement and definition differences are due to limitations related to the availability of data. Therefore, researchers should be conscious of this important fact when interpreting their empirical results. David et al. (2000) criticised the econometric methods of nearly all research performed until the end of the 1990s for largely ignoring endogeneity problems. 4 Table 1 shows how the traditional approach relied on least squares (OLS) estimation of linear regression models.
However, the potential sources of endogeneity might lead to inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of subsidies on private R&D decisions. To address endogeneity problems in such a way as to obtain appropriate estimates of this causal effect, several approaches have been used, which can be summarised as follows: 1) difference-in-differences estimators; 2) sample selection models; 3) instrumental variables; and 4) non-parametric matching methods. 5 The approaches depend on different sets of assumptions, so they differ in their advantages and disadvantages. This fact has led several researchers (e.g., Aerts and Thowarth, 2008; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Özçelik and Taymaz, 2008) to suggest combining some of them (see Table   1 ) to improve the accuracy of the evaluation study. Recently, some researchers have taken a step forward by proposing new econometric approaches, such as the conditional difference-indifferences estimator (e.g., Aerts and Schmidt, 2008).
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SOME KEY ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC R&D SUBSIDIES AND PRIVATE R&D SPENDING
As discussed earlier, the empirical literature reports mixed results about the causal effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment. To disentangle the reasons behind this conflicting evidence, it is worthwhile to put forward some ways to improve the empirical analysis about this causal relationship that have been scarcely explored until now. Among the most representative issues, we focus on firms' subsidy history, the time lag, the existence of financial constraints, the components of R&D, and the amount and sources of public subsidies of private firms' R&D.
Subsidy History
Among the main contributions that describe the history of subsidies to firms, it is worth mentioning Aschhoff (2009 ), Duguet (2004 , Bloch and Graversen (2008) , Hussinger (2008) , and González and Pazó (2008) . There is pervasive evidence in the existing literature to indicate that the subsidies granted to a firm are relatively persistent over time, so that a firm whose R&D activity was subsidised in the past is more likely to be subsidised again.
However, from the theoretical point of view, it is uncertain how a firm's subsidy history affects its level of R&D investment as there can be opposing crowding-in and crowding-out effects. Aschhoff (2009, pp.6-7) describes the existence of several forces at play in this relationship.
Firms that were successful in the past in achieving public subsidies for their R&D projects might benefit from their experience, learning and information advantages in subsequent calls for subsidy applications. Such advantages entail lower application costs and better application opportunities for previously funded firms. Hence, their relative probabilities of applying more often increase. Additionally, their applications are expected to be better tailored to the subsidy criterion, which increases their probabilities of receiving a grant. We would thus expect the projects of previously funded firms to be selected more often, irrespective of the firms' actual need for financial support.
The government's behaviour can also favour projects of firms that apply for subsidies more often for two reasons. On the one hand, governments tend to maximise the success rate of subsidised R&D projects, thus following a picking-the-winners strategy. On the other hand, government might comply with attempts of specific interest groups to prioritise certain firms.
In both cases, authorities give preference to the projects of those firms that show strong R&D capabilities in the light of the requirements of the call for applications. 7 However, projects with high expected returns would otherwise be fully financed by the firms or by private external investors.
Thus, firms that are granted public subsidies for their R&D are more likely to benefit from grants that reduce their own risk and cost of financing R&D projects. Consequently, the odds of a crowding-out effect for frequent recipients of R&D subsidies are increased (Aschhoff, 2009; Löof and Hesmati, 2005; Wallsten, 2000) .
All prior supplementary arguments lead us to put forward the following assumption: 
Time Lag
Most empirical studies have been concerned mainly with evaluating a contemporaneous or short-term effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D investment. However, as R&D investment takes time to implement, the full effect of a subsidy may be distributed over a longer period of time. To our knowledge, few empirical studies feature the specific time lag structure of subsidies on private R&D investment. Levy and Terleckyj (1983) find an average three-year lag in the complementary relationship between public R&D subsidies and private R&D. 9 Mansfield and Switzer (1984) and Lichtenberg (1984) also find a complementary relation that takes effect after two years. 10 Klette and Møen (1998) find that temporary R&D subsidies seem to stimulate firms to increase their R&D expenditures after the subsidies have expired -in most cases, during the first two years. Bentzen and Smith (1999) also reveal a positive and significant influence of public R&D on private R&D in the long term.
Nevertheless, they do not identify the specific time lag. find a one-or two-year lag. Callejón and García-Quevedo (2002) and Lach (2002) find that the effect of public subsidies primarily takes place with a time lag of one year and becomes non-significant after the second year.
In line with Levy and Terleckyj (1983, p.554 ) and other researchers (e.g., Klette and Møen, 1998; Lach, 2002; or Cerulli, 2010) , we argue that the effect of subsidies on private R&D activities might last longer than the subsidy itself. Receiving public funding via subsidies in one year can boost additional private R&D activities in subsequent years. David et al. (2000, pp.508-509) and others (e.g., Koga, 2005, pp.60-61) suggest that public funding of R&D can have two positive dynamic or 'long-term' effects on private R&D investment.
First, firms can benefit from the spillovers of the new science and engineering knowledge resulting from public R&D funding, thus enhancing firms' technological opportunities and, ultimately, innovative ability. Second, the availability of qualified research personnel that firms can hire is increased thanks to public funding of R&D activities.
Another important reason why the effect of subsidies need not be instantaneous and can be distributed over several years is the existence of firm adjustment costs (Lucas, 1967) associated with R&D activities. These activities are complex to implement and involve handling new resources or reallocating existing firm resources, such as qualified personnel, which would otherwise be devoted to production. If the firm optimal level of R&D investment is so high that it requires a substantial reorganisation within the firm, the costs to the firm can be much higher that if the firm distributes the necessary changes over a longer length of time. In addition to technological reasons, adjustment costs can be increased by the existence of market imperfections. The major consequence of adjustment costs is that, in general, it will take several years for the firm to achieve its target R&D investment. In particular, the response of firm R&D investment to public subsidies will not be instantaneous, but rather distributed over several years.
All of these arguments lead us to posit the following assumption:
Research assumption 2:
The effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment might not be instantaneous, but rather distributed over several years.
Financial Constraints
Financial constraints due to capital market imperfections have been raised as a major reason for government intervention in private R&D investment (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 1992 Hall, , 2002 Ughetto, 2008; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010 Many empirical studies show that private R&D projects are mostly financed by internal funds (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Hall, 1992; Hao and Jaffe, 1993; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto, 2008) . There are several reasons for the relative scarcity of external funding of R&D projects, all of which have to do with the extreme uncertainty about their success and their potential benefits (e.g., Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Ughetto, 2008 ) and the strategic nature of R&D, which might restrain managers from revealing the features of their R&D projects to prevent their disclosure to competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Scellato, 2007; Ughetto, 2008) . Such reasons lead to asymmetry of information problems, like adverse selection and moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) , that might discourage external investors, whose assessment of the expected returns is less reliable than the internal assessment (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2010; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010; Ughetto, 2008) .
Moreover, the intangible nature of R&D hinders the use of collateral by innovative firms to secure their borrowing (Berger and Udell, 1990; Bester, 1985; Hubbard, 1998; Močnik, 2001; Ughetto, 2008) .
The aforementioned circumstances can lead to a higher cost of external finance due to requirements of a risk premium on external finance, or even to the possibility of finance rationing. Thus, firms will be prompted to put more weight on internal funds to conduct their R&D projects, making their R&D decisions sensitive to their availability of internal liquidity.
In this respect, a shortage of internal liquidity might circumscribe firms' ability to conduct R&D projects that would otherwise be undertaken (Czarnitzki et al., 2011, p.528 ).
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The empirical evidence is, in general, consistent with the view that financial constraints may deter successful R&D projects (Czarnitzki et al., 2011) and that public R&D subsidies appear as a public policy instrument aimed at offsetting the negative effect of financial constraints on private R&D activities (Wren, 1994; Blanes and Busom, 2004; Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005) . 12 Ali-Yrkkö (2005) shows that financially constrained companies are more likely to use public subsidies to finance riskier but promising R&D projects that would otherwise be dismissed or postponed. In particular, he finds a positive effect of public funding on R&D of small firms, which are more likely to face financial constraints. 13 Furthermore, we think the role of public subsidies can be especially relevant for small and young firms, for which liquidity constraints can be more severe. 14 All of these arguments lead us to propose the following:
Research assumption 3:
The crowding-in effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment will be stronger in financially constrained firms. In this context, we also expect the crowding-in effect to be stronger in small and young firms.
Components of R&D
Most empirical studies, as shown by Table 1 , have treated private R&D expenditure as a single or homogeneous activity. However, Mansfield (1980) and others (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Clausen, 2007; Diamond, 1999; Link, 1982; Nelson, 1959; Robson, 1993) have highlighted that R&D activity spans a wide range of different complex tasks. At a minimum, the traditional breakdown of R&D expenditure into its two major components, Research and Development, deserves to be considered. 15 Several studies have explored the effect of public subsidies and public R&D activities on the two major components of R&D. For instance, the empirical studies by Higgins and Link (1981) and Aerts and Thorwarth (2008) note that public R&D activities tend to reduce the research expenditure by private firms. The latter authors find a positive effect of public R&D subsidies on private expenditures on development. In the same line, Link (1982) finds a positive effect of increased public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure, which is mostly aimed at development. 16 On the contrary, Robson (1993) and Diamond (1999) find positive effects of public subsidies on private R&D, which mostly affect (basic) research expenditures. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find that public subsidies have a significant and positive effect on private research expenditures, whereas the effect on private development expenditures is also positive but non-significant. Interestingly, Clausen (2007) distinguishes between public subsidies for research and for development. He finds that whereas subsidies to research have a positive effect on private R&D (particularly, research) expenditures, subsidies to development tend to substitute for private R&D expenditures, mostly reducing private development spending.
It is widely agreed that research activities and development activities are very different in their features and their prospects. In particular, uncertainty and intangibility characterise research to a greater extent than development. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) , among others, emphasise that a firm's research activity stimulates its 'absorptive capacity', a major intangible that improves the firm's competitive advantage. Nelson (1959) suggests that firms devoted to exploratory research, which are more focused on research than on development, enjoy better long-term prospects. Czarnitzki et al. (2009) , in line with Griliches (1986) , also show that research expenditures yield higher probabilities of patenting than development expenditures.
By the same token, the uncertain and intangible outcomes of research projects prevent their full appropriation by firms. Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) suggest that firm underinvestment is likely to be more stringent in research than in development activities as the returns associated with the former are harder to appropriate. In this respect, public subsidies can reduce the gap between social and private benefits, fostering research projects of private firms (Clausen, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2011) . On the contrary, development projects usually face less uncertainty and have much higher tangibility than research projects.
These projects are 'close to the market' and, therefore, "similar to practical and firm specific problem-solving activities" (Clausen, 2007, p.5) . Moreover, such projects usually have specific commercial (and therefore tangible) objectives, so firm have the proper incentives to perform their development projects to the extent that their returns can usually be appropriated (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008) . Consequently, the traditional market failure argument (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1988) to justify public subsidies is much weaker in the case of development projects as opposed to research projects.
All of these arguments lead us to put forward the following assumption:
Research assumption 4: The response of firms to public subsidies might be dependent on the composition of R&D investment. We would expect public subsidies to have a stronger crowding-in effect, the larger the weight of research activities and the smaller the weight of development activities in firm R&D investment.
Subsidy Amount
In the empirical assessment of the effect of public subsidies on firms' R&D investment, most studies have disregarded the amount of the subsidy granted to the firm. However, the amount of subsidies received differs very much between firms. Four notable studies focus on the quantitative effect of the subsidy amount granted to the firms. find a nonlinear relationship between public subsidies and privately financed R&D, namely, an inverted U-shaped curve. Thus, the subsidy effect is positive but marginally decreasing up to a certain threshold, beyond which the effect becomes negative. This result suggests a crowding-in effect of moderate subsidy amounts and a crowding-out effect for subsidies beyond a certain level. Zhu et al. (2006) and Görg and Strobl (2007) find similar results. Aschhoff (2009) demonstrates that a minimum grant size is necessary to increase the scope of firm-financed R&D activities and remarks that, for a certain subsidy amount, the sign of its effect might depend on the size of the project. Larger projects might be more dependent on the provision of public money, whereas firms might be more willing to bear the risk of a smaller project alone. Hence, for a given subsidy amount, the larger the project, the higher the probability of a crowding-in effect becomes. Nevertheless, we should expect R&D activities to be inelastic beyond a certain degree. The firm's resources circumscribe the scale of its business, which also includes R&D activities, because their capabilities are limited. If the firm receives more subsidies to conduct a larger project, so that it must use its resources to its maximum capacity, the firm might reallocate R&D funds from other projects to the largest one, thus postponing or discontinuing other projects. Therefore, other things being equal, the probability of a crowding-out effect can be expected to increase with the subsidy size. Thus, we assume that:
Research assumption 5: The effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment might be characterised by an inverted U-shaped curve. Such an effect is positive up to a certain threshold (i.e., the crowding-in effect would prevail) and negative beyond (with the crowdingout effect dominating).
Sources of Funding
In most countries, a variety of public agencies provide public subsidies for private R&D.
In particular, supranational, national and regional subsidy programmes exist in EU countries, 17 and federal and state subsidy programmes operate in the US. Most empirical studies have addressed the effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment irrespective of the public agency granting the subsidies, so the 'average' effect of subsidies is considered.
This statement is acknowledged in Table 1 , which shows that most existing research has evaluated the effect of single subsidy programmes allocated by agencies at the level of federal or national governments. Nonetheless, several researchers have explored the average effect of R&D programmes allocated by different public agencies at the international, national or regional levels. 18 Although the evidence is mixed, most studies provide support for additionality when the 'average' effect of subsidies awarded by different agencies is considered. Blanes and Busom (2004) 19 find that differences between firms, industries and public agencies affect firms' participation in different public subsidy programmes (mainly at the national and regional levels). To our knowledge, Clausen (2007) is the only study that addresses whether public programmes conducted by different public agencies entail different effects on private R&D investment.
We argue that the way in which private R&D investment is affected by the features of the source of public funding, namely, the public agency involved, deserves further study. In particular, it would be worthwhile to study the grant criteria established by the different public agencies and construct taxonomies to assess how different requirements and awarding criteria can stimulate or substitute private R&D spending (see David et al., 2000; 2000, among others). Clausen (2007) finds that the source of a subsidy influences whether it is used to stimulate firm R&D activities (mainly research activities) or to substitute some of them (mainly development activities).
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Even in the unlikely case that requirements and awarding criteria do not differ among public agencies, assuming also small application costs, we would expect that a firm applying to one agency for a subsidy might also apply to other agencies for subsidies to fund the same R&D project (Blanes and Busom, 2004 
CONCLUSIONS
A large number of empirical studies in the last five decades have investigated the effectiveness of public subsidies of private R&D spending. In general, scholars and policymakers agree about the desirability of subsidising private R&D activities. The market failure argument resting on the 'public good' nature of innovations, which deters full appropriation and leads the level of private innovation below the socially optimal level, drives this agreement. Furthermore, capital market imperfections leading to financial constraints on risky projects, such as R&D activities, also contribute to reducing the private R&D investment below the socially optimal level (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 1992 Hall, , 2002 . Public R&D activities and public subsidies of private R&D are used as policy instruments to fill the gap between the private and the socially optimal levels of R&D investment. Accordingly, many empirical studies have aimed at assessing the causal effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment.
Our review of the empirical literature on the impact of public subsidies on private R&D investments yields the following conclusions. First, together with the increasing availability of appropriate data, there is rising concern about the effectiveness of public subsidies, which reflects societal demands for efficient use of public funds. Second, most studies have concentrated on developed countries, mainly the US and the EU countries, and there is little evidence for other countries, particularly developing and emerging countries. Third, most available data come from studies performed at the firm level, as the firm is the real recipient of public subsidies. We agree there are outstanding empirical contributions based on aggregate data on the effect of subsidies on private R&D decisions, and that studies with aggregate and micro data complement each other. However, we believe that longitudinal micro data at firm, establishment or plant level allow addressing questions at the very same level at which decisions are taken. Such data allow accounting not only for dynamic considerations -as with aggregate time-series data-but also for heterogeneity among those agents (firms, establishment or plants) that are the potential receivers of public subsidies.
More aggregated data are less adequate because they hide firm heterogeneity, which is extremely relevant for distinguishing firms' R&D strategies. To our knowledge, many current firm-level datasets lack information that would be critical for understanding the role of public subsidies in private R&D. We have, implicitly or explicitly, suggested the information that would be worthy of investigation as it applies to the issues that have been examined in this research. Fourth, empirical work has mostly focused on the manufacturing sector. However, the services sector has an increasing and prominent weight in most developed countries. It is therefore important to analyse R&D investment in this sector, to understand how public subsidies affect it, and to compare the results with those for manufacturing. Fifth, most studies have explored the effect of public subsidies on private R&D investments in the short term, but dynamic considerations must be acknowledged. Empirical evidence suggests that the effect of public subsidies on private R&D need not be instantaneous and can be distributed over a longer span of time, so short-term and long-term effects might differ. Crosssectional data cannot be used for this purpose, and firm-level longitudinal data are needed.
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of public subsidies is mixed and therefore inconclusive. Although results supporting the additionality hypothesis prevail, there are valuable contributions in favour of the substitution hypothesis and others that demonstrate a negligible effect. We believe that, in addition to methodological differences, the theoretical framework of analysis, the population under study (e.g., the country and sample period, the type of firms) and the sources and characteristics of the subsidy programmes might determine whether the additionality or the substitution effect is observed.
Although the most recent studies are more similar to one another in their methodological approaches, we argue that the empirical literature has tended to focus on a subset of the issues at stake while disregarding others. The existing empirical literature on the effectiveness of public R&D subsidies has been constrained by a lack of information and analysis on the following main issues: 1) the firm's history of past and current subsidies (i.e., the frequency with which a firm receives subsidies); 2) the time lag structure (i.e., how the potential effect of subsidies is distributed over time); 3) the firm's internal liquidity and potential financial constraints; 4) the composition of firm R&D; 5) the amount of subsidy granted to the firm; and 6) the different sources of public subsidies. Our survey shows that most of these issues have been addressed separately in different studies, primarily since the end of the 1990s. We believe that considering all of these issues explicitly would improve our understanding of public subsidies and their impact on firm R&D strategy. Specifically, we aimed at contributing to scholarly knowledge with the research assumptions propounded in this study.
We posit that, under different situations, public subsidies are expected to exert additionality or substitution effects on private R&D investment.
We must acknowledge, nonetheless, that there are further interesting issues that we have not raised in this study that would also be worth exploring. 21 These include the wage effects of subsidies (see , the interaction of public subsidies with other mechanisms -such as tax incentives-to boost private R&D (see Guellec and Pottelsberghe, 2003;  Bérubé and Mohnen, 2009), or the potential impacts of uncertainty and instability on subsidy policies (see Guellec and Pottelsberghe, 2003) . 22 This latter issue may also be of special interest in countries that are facing the negative consequences of the economic crisis that arose in the late 2000s.
In conclusion, a great number of researchers have made much progress in the study of the potential effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment. The issues explicitly considered in our study can inspire further advancement in the near future. Our survey suggests that although significant progress has already been made in this field of study, many interesting research issues remain to be tackled. (1) This column shows information on the major public agencies providing support for private R&D: F.G. (Federal Government) , N.G. (National Government), R.G. (Regional Government).
(2) This column shows how the effect of private R&D spending is explored, i.e., aggregately (A) or separately (S). In this latter case, we also distinguish between Research (R), Basic Research (BR) or Applied Research (AR) and Development (D).
(3) This column indicates whether the study provides information on a firm's subsidy history.
(4) This column shows whether the study considers short-term (S-t) and/or long-term (L-t) effects.
(5) This column shows whether the shape of the subsidy effect is assumed to be Linear (L) or Curvilinear (C).
(6) This column shows whether the study explores the effect of financial constraints (Yes or No), as well as the specific moderator variable involved in the empirical analysis. (7) This column displays the number of citations of each study weighted by the number of years since publication. The first figure in the bracket uses the ISI Web of Knowledge, while the second one uses Google Scholar. 
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(**) (*) Lower refers to studies performed at business unit-and plant-level or below.
(**) The total number of studies finding crowding-in, crowding-out or non-significant effects is 118. This number is greater than the number of reviewed studies (77) because there are several studies that find divergent results depending on the different assumptions and/or methods considered. Moreover, in most studies performed at country-level it is possible to confirm the crowding-in hypothesis in the case of some countries, but also the crowding-out hypothesis in the case of other countries, or even non-significant effects in some countries.
